Doodle polls allow people to schedule meetings or events based on time preferences of participants. Each participant indicates on a web-based poll form which time slots they find acceptable and a time slot with the most votes is chosen. This is a social choice mechanism known as approval voting, in which a standard assumption is that all voters vote sincerely-no one votes "no" on a time slot they prefer to a time slot they have voted "yes" on. We take a game-theoretic approach to understanding what happens in Doodle polls assuming participants vote sincerely. First we characterize Doodle poll instances where sincere pure Nash Equilibria (NE) exist, both under lexicographic tie-breaking and randomized tie-breaking. We then study the quality of such NE voting profiles in Doodle polls, showing the price of anarchy and price of stability are both unbounded, even when a time slot that many participants vote yes for is selected. Finally, we find some reasonable conditions under which the quality of the NE (and strong NE) is good. A 2-page extended abstract of an earlier version of this work was published in [2]. 3 A sample of over 340,000 polls in a 3-month period in 2011 had a median of about 5 respondents and 12 time slots [17].
Introduction
Online scheduling apps such as Doodle (www.doodle.com) are an increasingly popular tool for scheduling meetings and other events.In a January 2018 personal communication, Doodle reported more than 27 million polls created per year with total users numbering nearly 30 million. In a Doodle poll, the poll initiator posts a set of possible meeting times, then asks participants to check off the times they are available to meet. The Doodle algorithm simply recommends the time slot(s) with the most checked boxes. This mechanism employed by Doodle for recommending the best time slot is a social choice function equivalent to approval voting, where each voter in an election must indicate approval or disapproval of each of the candidates. In a Doodle poll, the participants are the "voters" and the time slots are the "candidates." There has been extensive research done in approval voting dating back to the 1970s. For surveys on approval voting from the voting theory literature see [3, 16, 11] . However, in contrast to political elections where the voter-to-candidate ratio is very high, Doodle polls are usually conducted on a relatively small scale 3 , which allows strategic voting to more easily takes place. Researchers have studied the effect of strategic voting behavior (e.g., [15, 5] ), even with respect to approval voting in particular [7, 8, 12, 13] . As in the work of [7] , we are interested in how the social welfare of the selected candidate compares with that of the optimal, but we consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) voting outcomes, while they consider randomized embeddings of utility functions into voting rules. The work of [15] also considered voting outcomes that maximize social welfare in comparison with equilibrium outcomes. While their work on plurality voting took a computational approach to finding the NE (and Bayes NE) outcomes, we focus on theoretical worst-case analysis for the approval voting mechanism used in Doodle polls, which are the motivating real-world application of our work.
Similar to the work of [5] , which asks 'How bad is selfish voting?', we compare the worst-case NE outcome to the optimal outcome. However, we use social welfare as our metric, while they use a candidate's "honest score" as their metric. They also consider NE that result after a sequence of best response defections from the truthful voting profile, which is a unique voting profile in the three voting systems they consider. In contrast, approval voting does not have a single truthful voting profile, so in this work we study the space of all pure NE. The work of [6] studies team-based coordinated voting in online scheduling polls, giving results regarding computational complexity of finding payoff-improving voter coalitions, and finding NE.
As in [1] , we assume each voter has a privately-held, normalized, utility value (or valuation) for each candidate time slot. To measure the quality of a time slot, we consider the social welfare, or total utility of all voters, for that slot. But while the work of [1] studies the effect of more "protective" voting behavior compared with more "generous" voting behavior on the social welfare of the winning time slot, this work analyzes the price of anarchy and price of stability in Doodle polls. The price of anarchy (POA) (resp., price of stability (POS)) is the worst case ratio, over all possible instances of the game, of the social welfare of an optimal slot to the social welfare of the winning slot(s) at the "worst" (resp., "best") pure NE.
The work of [14] analyzes a Doodle game model similar to ours, with the added component of a "social bonus" each voter gets for each time slot they approve of. They also extensively study and compare the two tie-breaking rules: randomized tie-breaking versus lexicographic tie-breaking. They conclude that in the case of "uncapped" social bonus, most Doodle game instances in their model do not admit pure NE under lexicographic tie-breaking. They go on to focus on the case of "capped" social bonus where there are many NE profiles and use a variant of trembling hand perfection to refine them. In our model we do not have a "social bonus" for yes votes at all, and we find under this assumption that most instances do seem to admit a pure NE. We also show randomized tie-breaking also admits pure NE in most instances. As noted, Doodle allows the option for hidden polls, where voters only see their individual responses; such hidden polls negate the presence of a social bonus and thus further motivate the payoff function as defined in our model.
To our knowledge our work is the first to bound the inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls. Since Doodle polls are equivalent to approval voting, we note that our results also apply to approval voting in general, but our context for this work is Doodle polls, keeping in mind their idiosyncrasies (like the often low ratio of voters to candidates) that are not commonly found in general approval voting scenarios. First we investigate the space of Doodle poll instances where pure NE exist when assuming voters vote sincerely (i.e., they never disapprove of a time slot that they have higher utility for than a time slot they approved of), both under lexicographic and randomized tie-breaking. Then we show that when restricting to the space of instances that admit pure NE, both POA and POS are unbounded. We show this remains the case even when restricted to instances that have at least one time slot with high total valuation. We then give some reasonable conditions under which the POA and POS are good. Finally we present a constant bound on the strong price of anarchy when there are time slots with sufficiently high total valuation.
Model and Definitions
We define a Doodle poll instance to be a triple I = (A, V, U ), where A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m } is the set of time slots or alternatives, V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } is the set of voters, and U is the n × m matrix of utility values 0 ≤ u ij ≤ 1 that each voter i = 1 . . . n privately holds for each alternative j = 1 . . . m. We say voter v i prefers alternative a j to a k when u ij > u ik .
The utility can be thought of as quantifying how much the voter expects to benefit from attending the meeting at that time (even if derived merely by satisfying some expectation of attendance) minus any inconvenience/cost of attending the meeting at that time. It also may be thought of as representative of how much monetary value a voter would place on attending the event at a given time.
Notice that in Doodle polls, organizers and participants typically expect and believe that participants are not only sincere, but that they are also generally representing their "true" availability, allowing for the selection of a "good" meeting time. Indeed, other studies often assume the most straightforward behavior of a voter is simply to vote "yes" on those time slots for which she is available, and "no" on those she is unavailable. However, we submit that availability is not a binary value; in theory, a participant can make themselves available for any time slot, albeit at varying, and potentially quite high, cost. Our model of private cardinal utility values accounts for such a spectrum of "availability," while only requiring individual participants to make a yes/no determination.
Given an instance I, we use an n × m matrix denoted by R = [r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ] to represent the voting profile (or strategy profile), where r i is a binary vector over the m alternatives in A, representing the vote or strategy of voter i, with r i (j) = 1 (a yes vote) if voter v i approves alternative a j , and r i (j) = 0 (a no vote) otherwise. When it is clear from the context, we use vote to either refer to the full vector r i , or to the binary value the voter assigns to a specific alternative. We consider only pure strategies in this work, so we assume voters will not be randomizing among a set of possible votes.
Let s(a j ) = n i=1 r i (a j ), or the total count of votes of approval for alternative a j , be the score for an alternative a j . The default Doodle mechanism (approval voting) chooses the set of one or more winning alternatives, W , which maximize the total score, that is W = arg max aj ∈A s(a j ).
The most commonly-studied tie-breaking rules in the event of multiple alternatives with maximum score (|W | > 1) are lexicographic tie-breaking, in which the single winning alternative w ∈ W that comes first in the established tie-breaking order over A is chosen, and randomized tie-breaking, which chooses w from the winning alternatives in W uniformly at random. Under lexicographic tie-breaking, we assume without loss of generality that the tiebreaking order on the alternatives proceeds from left to right a 1 . . . a m in the poll, and each player i earns a payoff π i (I, R) of u ij if the chosen alternative w = a j . Under randomized tie-breaking, in the case of a tie, the expected payoff is E[π i (I, R)] = aj ∈W u ij /|W |, the average utility of the winning alternatives.
Our model most accurately reflects hidden Doodle polls, in which players do not see each others' votes. This removes the motivation for a "social bonus" term in the payoff function as used in [14] . Hidden polls also transform the setting into a simple simultaneous move game.
A pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile where no player can unilaterally defect to an alternate strategy (i.e. flip some of their voting bits) and strictly increase their payoff. I.e., at a NE no voter i can alter their vote vector r i ∈ R to a new vote vector r i , s.t. π i (I, R ) > π i (I, R) (for lexicographic tie-breaking), where R is R with r i replaced by r i . (For randomized tie-breaking payoffs are taken in expectation.)
We use OP T (I) to denote an optimal alternative, which maximizes the social welfare in a given Doodle poll instance I, and u(a) to denote the total utility (social welfare) of alternative a ∈ A. Hence OP T (I) = arg max aj ∈A n i=1 u ij and u(OP T (I)) = max aj ∈A n i=1 u ij . As justified in many classical and recent works, e.g., [3, 4, 9, 17, 14] , we assume all voters are sincere in their voting, i.e., if r i (a j ) = 1 then r i (a k ) = 1 for all k = j where u ik > u ij . Let sincere pure NE refer to a pure NE where all voters are voting sincerely (and may defect only to sincere strategies) and let N s (I) denote the set of sincere pure NE for Doodle poll instance I.
Given a Doodle poll instance I, we define sincere price of anarchy P OA(I) for that instance to be u(OP T (I)) min R∈Ns (I) u(w(R)) and sincere price of stability to be u(OP T (I)) max R∈Ns(I) u(w(R)) , where u(w(R)) is the social welfare of the winning alternative given profile R. Note that in the case of randomized tie-breaking, the expected social welfare is used in the denominator. We can then define the sincere price of anarchy (POA) of Doodle polls to be the worst-case P OA(I): max I∈I P OA(I), where I is the set of all Doodle poll instances. Respectively, we define the sincere price of stability (POS) to be the worst-case P OS(I): max I∈I P OS(I).
Existence of Sincere Pure Nash Equilibria
Since we analyze price of anarchy and price of stability only over the space of instances that admit sincere pure Nash equilibria, we investigate in this section what these types of instances look like, under both lexicographic and randomized tie-breaking. To begin with, as noted in [10] , "no voter can, by changing her vote only, change the outcome of the game [under] Approval Voting [...when...] one candidate is winning the election with a margin of more than two votes." We state this formally as the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
A voting profile is a sincere pure NE if the two largest scores differ by two or more, under either lexicographic or randomized tie-breaking.
We refer to an alternative a j ∈ A as a favorite of voter v i if u ij ≥ u ik for all k = j. And we say that an alternative a j ∈ A is a kth favorite of voter v i if there are exactly k − 1 alternatives j for which u ij > u ij . Corollary 1. If two or more voters have a favorite alternative in common, then there is a sincere pure NE where the set of winning alternatives W is precisely that favorite alternative, under both lexicograpic and randomized tie-breaking.
Corollary 2. If the number of voters exceeds the number of alternatives, that is, n > m, then there is a sincere pure NE, under both lexicographic and randomized tie-breaking.
These corollaries already describe a rather large space of instances where a sincere pure NE always exists. However, sincere pure NE do not always exist, under either lexicographic or randomized tie-breaking. We provide specific instances for each tie-breaking rule, while characterizing further some situations where sincere pure NE do exist.
Lexicographic Tie-breaking
Corollaries 1 and 2 collectively ensure the existence of a sincere pure NE under lexicographic tie-breaking whenever two or more voters have the same favorite, and whenever n > m. Furthermore, the following lemma ensures the existence of a sincere pure NE when n = m. These conditions greatly limit the potential instances without a sincere pure NE, and we provide a specific instance in Table 1 that does not have a sincere pure NE under lexicographic tie-breaking.
Lemma 2. If the number of voters equals the number of alternatives, that is, n = m, then there is a sincere pure NE, under lexicographic tie-breaking.
Proof. By Corollary 1, assume each voter has a different favorite. Since n = m, there must be a voter v whose favorite is alternative a 1 . The voting profile in which all votes are no except a single yes vote to a 1 from voter v is sincere. Furthermore, under lexicographic tie-breaking, since the winning alternative is leftmost, no voter has incentive to defect.
Note that Lemma 2 does not hold under randomized tie-breaking, as Table 2 will illustrate. The following lemma will help us to establish the fact that sincere pure NE do not always exist under lexicographic tie-breaking. Proof. Suppose we have a NE with winning score s(w) on alternative w. If s(w) = n, all voters are already voting yes for alternative w, so we may assume s(w) < n. With lexicographic tie-breaking, the scores on all alternatives left of w are strictly less than s(w), and all alternatives to the right of w have score at most s(w). Suppose we take the existing NE profile, and then modify it so that all voters vote yes to alternative w, and anything else required by sincerity. The score for w is now s(w) + x = n. Since the yes votes required by sincerity add at most x to the scores for other alternatives, updated scores to the left of w are strictly less than s(w)+x, and those to the right are at most s(w)+x, with w still the winning alternative. Furthermore, since the only yes votes that are added in alternatives other than alternative w are due to sincerity, if any voter wishes to defect now, they likewise would have prior to the addition, contradicting the assumption that we started with a NE. Table 1 . For alternatives j = 2, 3, 4, 5, observe that if all n votes on alternative j are yes, then by sincerity there are n − 1 yes votes on alternative j − 1, and each of those n − 1 voters who voted yes on j − 1 wish to defect by saying no to alternative j. Likewise, if all n votes on alternative 1 are yes, then by sincerity, all n votes on alternative 5 are yes; due to lexicographic tie-breaking, alternative 1 would win, but since alternative 5 is preferred by all n voters, they each wish to defect by saying no to alternative 1. Hence, in any sincere voting profile where all voters say yes to a given alternative, at least one voter wishes to defect.
Randomized Tie-breaking
We now proceed comparably for randomized tie-breaking, providing a broad categorization of instances which do have sincere pure NE, and again showing that sincere pure NE do not always exist. Recall that we refer to an alternative a j ∈ A as a favorite of a voter if that voter (weakly) prefers it to all other alternatives. And we say that an alternative a j ∈ A is an ith favorite of a voter if there are exactly i − 1 alternatives which they strictly prefer to a j . We say an n × n instance does not have distinct ith favorites if for i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, some alternative is the ith favorite of two or more voters. Proof. We proceed by using strong induction. Base case: Corollary 1 ensures that any instance where an alternative is the favorite (i.e. i = 1) of two or more voters has a sincere pure NE. Inductive step: Assume that no alternative is the 1, 2, 3, . . . , or kth favorite of two or more voters, for k < n − 1. We show if some alternative a is the k + 1st favorite of two or more voters, then there is a sincere pure NE.
Since no alternative is the ith favorite of two or more voters for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , k, and the instance is n × n, each alternative must be the favorite of exactly one voter, the 2nd favorite of exactly one voter, . . ., the kth favorite of exactly one voter. Moreover, by assumption, alternative a is the k + 1st favorite of two or more voters. Consider the voting profile consisting of yes votes for all of the 1st favorites, 2nd favorites, . . ., kth favorites, as well as any two of the k + 1st favorites in alternative a . Observe that this voting profile is consistent with sincerity. The scores are thus k + 2 for alternative a and k for all of the other n − 1 alternatives. Lemma 1 thus guarantees the existence of a sincere pure NE.
Lemma 4 in combination with Corollary 2 indicates that the space of instances that admit sincere pure NE seems quite general and large. For example, in the case of n = m, only instances that meet the rather strict structural requirement of distinct ith favorites do not have sincere pure NE. Note that Lemma 4 also applies to lexicographic tie-breaking, but is subsumed by Lemma 2. Table 2 . An instance with no sincere pure NE under randomized tie-breaking, for t and with 1 2 < t < 1 and 0 < < 1 2 , as described in the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Sincere pure NE do not always exist in Doodle polls under randomized tie-breaking.
Proof. Consider the instance in Table 2 , where 1 2 < t < 1 and 0 < < 1 2 . We consider the voting profiles and corresponding scores, and show by exhaustive cases (of winning score s = 0, 1, 2, or 3) that no pure NE exists under randomized tie-breaking. Observe that there are distinct favorites, which in this instance are on the diagonal, and recall that sincerity must be maintained.
Clearly, there is no NE where the winning score is s = 0; that would require all voters to vote no on all alternatives, and they would each have incentive to defect.
Consider what happens when the winning score is s = 1. If one voter is voting yes to all three alternatives and s = 1, since each voter has a single favorite alternative in this instance, this voter will always have incentive to defect; they prefer to say no to two of the alternatives, voting yes only for their favorite. If one voter is voting yes to exactly two alternatives, and s = 1, then there must be a voter who is not voting yes to their favorite alternative who would thus prefer to defect and have their favorite alternative win with two yes votes. Thus, we are left only with the case where each voter is voting yes to at most one alternative, which, due to sincerity, must be their favorite alternative. If only one alternative has a yes vote, then it can easily be verified that either of the other voters would wish to defect and vote yes to their favorite. Likewise, if two of the alternatives have yes votes, in all three such scenarios within this instance, the third voter would prefer to defect to cause a three-way tie. Thus, the only possible NE with s = 1 is a three-way tie for the favorites on the diagonal. But this is also not a NE: since t > 1 2 , voter A would rather have t than their payoff in the tie (1+t)/3, and thus prefers to defect by voting for alternative 2.
Now, consider the case where the winning score is s = 2. Suppose first that there are two or more alternatives with a score of 2. Then some voter is voting yes to two or more of the winning alternatives and such a voter would wish to defect so their favorite alternative alone wins. In the subcase that all three alternatives have a score of 2, if one voter is voting yes for all three alternatives, then that voter would wish to defect by saying no to all but their favorite. Thus, with reported scores on the three alternatives of 2, 2, and 2, each voter must be voting yes for their favorite and second favorite. In this case, voter B would wish to defect since the payoff to voter B when alternatives 1 and 2 are tied, 1 2 (1 + 0) > 1 3 (1 + + 0), its payoff in the three-way tie. We now consider the case with winning score s = 2 and other alternatives' scores are 1 or 0. Due to the structure of the utility values and sincerity, the winning alternative w with score 2 must have a yes vote from the player whose utility is 1 for alternative w (otherwise two alternatives would have a score of 2). If the other yes vote for w is from a player with a utility of 0 or for w, that voter would always prefer to defect to a vote of no on alternative w, so that their favorite (for which they are already voting yes, due to sincerity) would now be tied for winning; one can verify that with < 1/2, the (two-way or three-way) tie is better than their current valuation. If the other yes vote for w is from the player with a utility of t, so w = a 2 , then voter C currently getting 0 payoff must also be voting no on alternative a 1 (otherwise s(a 1 ) = s(w) = 2). So voter C would prefer to defect and vote yes to a 1 to cause the tie between a 1 and a 2 .
Finally, consider the case when the winning score is s = 3. Note that the structure of the utilities is such that each alternative is the favorite for one voter, the second favorite for another, and the least favorite for another. Thus, unanimous approval of an alternative in conjunction with sincerity implies that one of the other alternatives has at least one yes vote, and the other alternative has at least two yes votes. There cannot be two alternatives with 3 yes votes, since all voters have distinct favorites, and at least one voter would defect to a no vote on their non-favorite so their preferred alternative would win (or be in a tie with fewer winning alternatives). Thus, only the cases where the scores (subject to permutation) are 3,2,2 and 3,2,1 remain. In both these remaining sub cases, one of the three votes for the winning alternative w must come from a voter for whom w is their least favorite. So that voter would prefer to defect and vote no on w, allowing another alternative to win. This 3 × 3 instance can be extended to a 3 × x instance (for x > 3) by adding alternatives with 0 valuation. Observe that Table 2 does have a sincere pure NE under lexicographic tie-breaking: namely, the voting profile in which voter A votes yes to alternative 1, and all other votes are no for all voters is sincere and a NE.
Price of Stability (and POA) are Unbounded
In this section we exhibit instances that show both price of anarchy and price of stability are unbounded, regardless of which tie-breaking mechanism is used. We first show that POA is unbounded even when the score must be at least n 2 and when the utility of OPT must be at least n 2 . We then provide instances in which POS is likewise unbounded with large score/utility. For the remainder of this work, we use the shortened term "NE" to refer to sincere pure NE. We let > 0 be an arbitrarily small value. Table 3 . An instance in which POA is unbounded, for an arbitrary odd n, where OPT has utility n 2 and score at least n 2 for the best NE. Proof. Consider the instance in Table 3 for an arbitrary odd n ≥ 5, and > 0 arbitrarily small. Alternative 2 is optimal with a utility of n+1 2 . Consider the voting profile where all voters vote yes for all alternatives with non-zero utility, and no to alternatives with zero utility. Clearly this is sincere. It is also a NE, since alternative 1 will have a score of n, and the two other alternatives will have scores of n+1 2 and n−1 2 . Since n ≥ 5, there is no incentive for any voter to defect. Thus, the utility of this NE is n . Thus, the price of anarchy is n+1 2 /(n ) = 1 2 + 1 2n which becomes arbitrarily large for arbitrarily small.
Notes: For randomized tie breaking, we need n ≥ 5 since if n was 3, then the scores would be 3, 2, and 1, and a voter who voted yes to an in the first column could defect. We could easily have an instance with an even number of rows by adding in an additional row with , 0, 1.
Observe that in the Table 3 instance, POS is 1 since a voting profile where all voters vote yes on alternatives with valuation 1 and no on all other alternatives is sincere, gives the OPT, and can easily be verified to be a NE. Further, not only is the score at least n/2 but the total utility of the optimal alternative is also at least n/2.
We now provide an instance where OPT has utility of almost n − 2, but POS is still unbounded. Note that when the utility of OPT is high, it becomes more likely that OPT itself is a NE, so it becomes harder to find an instance with high POS. The following instance relies on a structure in which for many of the alternatives, all but one voter likes another alternative more, so defections move away from the optimal. Table 4 . An instance with unbounded POS even when OPT has utility close to n − 2.
Theorem 4. Sincere POS is unbounded in Doodle polls, even when |OP T | ≈ n − 2. Furthermore, the claim holds under both randomized and lexicographic tie-breaking.
Proof. Consider the instance in Table 4 with m ≥ 2. Note that n = m + 1, and c can be arbitrarily close to 1 as long as (m − 1) < c < 1 − (m − 2) . OPT is the final alternative, a m , with a utility 1+(m−2)c+2 . If we can show that the only NE is one in which the alternative a 1 wins, which has a utility of m(m + 1) , then we have shown that POS is unbounded.
To verify that the first alternative is the winning alternative in a NE, consider the voting profile that votes yes for all values in a 1 , and precisely the other values required by sincerity, namely the valuations of 1 and c + x (for any positive x). This yields scores of m+1 for a 1 , and j −1 for all other alternatives j = 2, . . . , m. Thus, since all alternatives other than the first have a score of at most m − 1, Lemma 1 ensures this is a NE.
We now show that none of the alternatives 2 through m win in a NE. Observe that for i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1, all but voter i prefers a m−i to a m−i+1 . Thus, for i = m, . . . , 2, a i is not a winner in any NE, because if it were, then by sincerity a i−1 must be within one vote of a i , since anyone other than voter m − i + 1 must be voting for a i−1 if they are voting for a i . Hence, one of the voters would prefer to defect and either vote no on a i or vote yes on a i−1 , so that a i−1 becomes either tied for winning or the strict winner; with lexicographic tie-breaking from left to right, a i−1 would be the strict winner. Hence, an outcome where a i is winning is not a NE.
The instance can be extended. Additional rows identical to those below the horizontal dashed line can be added: the utility remains arbitrarily close to m−1, which is now n minus the number of rows below said dashed line. Additional columns identical to column 1, or with larger multiples of , can also be added before the vertical dashed line, and POS likewise remains unbounded.
Bounds on POS and Strong POA
In this section we describe some situations where price of stability is good.
Since Corollary 1 guarantees that there is a NE which selects an optimal alternative, the following corollaries identify situations in which POS is 1. We then provide a characterization of the set of Doodle polls instances where the expected social welfare in the best NE is optimal. Theorem 5. Given a Doodle poll instance I under randomized tie-breaking, P OS(I) = 1 if and only if there is no alternative that n − 1 voters prefer to an optimal alternative. I.e., for each non-optimal alternative, at least 2 players prefer an optimal alternative to it.
Proof. If P OS(I) = 1, and hence an optimal alternative a * has the most votes at a NE, we assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some other alternative that n − 1 voters prefer to a * . We call this more preferred alternative a , and the one voter who does not prefer it v * . Then any voter v = v * approving the optimal a * would also be voting yes on a by sincerity, which would imply s(a ) ≥ s(a * ) − 1. And in this case, any of those voters v = v would prefer to defect and say no to a * (if they were voting yes to a * ), or defect and say yes to a (if they were voting no to it), contradicting the assumption that we are at a NE. Note that if they were all voting no to a * and yes to a it would contradict the fact that a * has the most votes.
We now proceed to show the converse: having no alternative that n−1 voters prefer to an optimal implies P OS(I) = 1. Let alternative a s be optimal. Suppose all voters vote yes for a s , and vote yes for other alternatives as needed to enforce sincerity. We claim this voting strategy is a NE.
Since all voters vote yes for a s , it has n votes. Suppose voter v p believes that she can improve her personal valuation by unilaterally changing her vote, while maintaining sincerity. We consider all possible actions she could take, and show that none of them in fact improve her personal valuation, showing that the current solution is indeed a NE. Action 1: She keeps her yes vote for a s , but votes yes on another alternative a x , for which she had previously said no. For this to improve her personal valuation, a x must now be selected, and u px > u ps . But since a s had n votes, the maximum possible, a x must also now have n votes and be selected instead of a s by tie-breaking. For a x to now have n votes, all voters other than p must have voted yes to it, ensuring that ∀ i =p,i∈[n] u ix ≥ u is , since votes for alternatives other than a s were based solely on sincerity. The social welfare of a x is n i=1 u ix . Thus, the social welfare of a x is also u px
u is which is the social welfare of a s . But this contradicts the fact that a s was the optimal solution. Action 2: She keeps her yes vote for a s , but votes no on another alternative a x , for which she had previously said yes. This change keeps the vote count at n for a s , but only lowers the vote count on a x , so her personal valuation does not improve.
Action 3: She votes no on a s (and possibly changes her votes on other alternatives as well) and alternative a x is now selected, for which she is voting no. Since a s has n − 1 yes votes, and a x can have at most n − 1 votes, again, there is at best a tie, so voter p will not switch. Why? For a x to now be selected as a winning alternative with v p voting no to it, a x must have n − 1 yes votes from all other voters. But since all other voters are voting for a x based solely on sincerity, then by the same argument as in Action 1, for this to occur, a s must not in fact be the optimal solution. Hence, the desired contradiction is again reached. Action 4: She votes no on a s (and possibly changes her votes on other alternatives as well) and alternative a x is now selected, for which she is voting yes. For her personal situation to improve, u px > u ps . But since she originally said yes to a s , then by sincerity, she had to originally say yes to a x as well. Alternative a s still has n − 1 yes votes. If a x has n yes votes, then in the original voting strategy, it also did, and thus by the same argument as in Action 1, for this to occur, a s must not in fact be an optimal solution. Thus, we must conclude that a x has n − 1 yes votes, but this contradicts our assumption that no alternative has n − 1 voters that prefer it to an optimal slot. For a given instance I, we note that P OA(I) (and hence P OS(I)) is trivially upper-bounded by max a∈A u(a) min a∈A u(a) . However, the alternative a min = arg min a∈A u(a) can only be chosen in a NE if there is no other alternative n − 1 voters prefer to it. If n − 1 voters prefer another alternative, then by sincerity that alternative has a score within one of the chosen alternative, meaning some voter can defect and improve their payoff. This observation gives the following bound on POA. Proposition 1. Given a Doodle poll instance I, let a low be the lowest utility alternative s.t. at least two voters prefer a low to a for all other alternatives a ∈ A. Then we have: P OS(I) ≤ P OA(I) ≤ u(OP T (I)) u(a low ) .
Strong NE
A strong NE is a voting profile where no subset (or "coalition") of voters can all simultaneously defect and improve their payoff. All strong NE are NE, and strong NE may not always exist. The strong POA (resp, P OS) is defined as the ratio of the total utility of an optimal alternative to the total utility of the alternative chosen in the worst (resp., best) strong NE, assuming one exists. It has been established (in [4] ) that strong NE coincide precisely with those voting profiles that select Condorcet winners. A weak Condorcet winner a c is a candidate such that the number of voters who prefer a c to a for any other a ∈ A is at least the number who prefer a to a c .
Lemma 5 (Adapted from [4] ). Given a Doodle poll instance I = (A, V, U ), an alternative a ∈ A is a winning alternative in a strong NE if and only if a is a weak Condorcet winner.
We can now show that strong POA is at most 4 when there is an alternative with utility at least 3n 4 , or more generally:
Theorem 6. Given a Doodle poll instance I = (A, V, U ) that admits a strong NE, if u(a j ) ≥ ρn for some a j ∈ A, 1 ≥ ρ > 1/2, then strong POA, and hence strong POS, satisfy sP OS(I) ≤ sP OA(I) ≤ 1/(ρ − 1/2), which approaches 2 as ρ approaches 1.
Proof. If I admits a strong NE, then there is some weak Condorcet winner a c ∈ A, where a c is preferred to any other a ∈ A by at least half the voters (by Lemma 5). If u(a j ) ≥ ρn for some a j ∈ A, then more than ρ of the voters have strictly positive utility for a j . If at least half the voters prefer a c to a j , then u(a c ) ≥ ρn − n/2 = n(ρ − 1/2). Since u(OP T (I)) ≤ n, we thus have sP OS = u(OP T (I))/u(a c ) ≤ 1/(ρ − 1/2).
Conclusion
Our results have shown that there are many natural Doodle poll instances that admit sincere pure Nash Equilibria. In particular, almost all instances where the number of voters is at least the number of candidates (that is, n ≥ m) admit sincere pure NE under both randomized and lexicographic tie-breaking. It remains future work to determine when sincere pure NE exist in the case where m > n (the number of candidates exceeds the number of voters), which is not common in standard approval voting settings, but is not so unusual to encounter in a Doodle poll. Our results have also shown that while the price of anarchy and price of stability are both unbounded, the conditions we found that give rise to these cases seem rather particular and unlucky. We also show that there is also a large set of realistic Doodle poll instances where P OS = 1; for example, P OS = 1 when the optimal time slot is the favorite of at least two voters. Finally, we also show that strong POA is reasonable when there is at least one time slot with total utility more than n/2. In future work, we hope to expand our understanding of the set of Doodle poll instances where the POA or POS are good, possibly by restricting ourselves to instances where voters cannot vote for all or none of the time slots. We also hope to gather data, and using simulated utility values see if such conditions are likely to be present in most real-life Doodle polls, and also check how commonly the outcomes of the polls are at NE.
